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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Roy Roland Araiza entered an ldaho Criminal Rule (hereinaffer, Rule) 1l(a)(2) 
conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance, preserving his right to 
appeal the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of seven years, with one year fixed, upon Mr. Araiza. Mr. Araiza's right 
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures protected by the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I § I 7  of the ldaho 
Constitution were violated when officers broke down the door of his residence and 
arrested him for obstructing and delaying a police investigation. Specifically, officers did 
not have probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed, nor was there a 
"compelling need for official action and no time to secure a warrant." See Welsh v. 
Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 
(Ct. App. 2001). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinas 
In December of 2006, Mary Jane Mosqueda lived at 108 E. Avenue F in Jerome, 
Idaho, and had resided there for almost three years. (Tr., p.51, L.24 - p.52, L.4.) Since 
July of that year, her son, Roy Araiza, had been living with her in the residence. 
(Tr., p.53, Ls.2-22.) On December 2, 2006, during the late evening hours, 
Ms. Mosqueda was awakened by a knock on her front door. (Tr., p.55, Ls.11-19.) 
Ms. Mosqueda got out of bed, went to the door, and opened it, to discover that it was 
her son ROY.' (Tr., p.55, Ls.20-22.) Ms. Mosqueda let her son into the residence. 
(Tr., p.56, Ls.1-2.) A short time later, there was another knock on the door and 
Ms. Mosqueda answered the door a second time, to discovered law enforcement 
officers standing outside her door. (Tr., p.59, L.3 - p.57, L.2.) Officer Dennis Clark 
inquired as to whether everything was okay at the residence and indicated that he had 
seen someone outside one of the windows of the residence. (Tr., p.8, Ls.1-19, p.57, 
Ls.3-12.) Ms. Mosqueda stated that everything was okay and informed Officer Clark 
that the individual that was outside her residence was "my son. He was knocking on the 
window of my other grandson to let him in."' (Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.8, p.57, Ls.12-14.) 
Officer Clark then requested to speak with her son and Ms. Mosqueda called to her son, 
Mr. Araiza, who was lying down in bed, to come speak to the officers. (Tr., p.57, L.21 - 
p.58, L.lO.) Ms. Mosqueda went back to her room while Mr. Araiza spoke to the 
officers. (Tr.,p.58, L.18-p.59, L.2.) 
During his conversation with Mr. Araiza, Officer Clark requested to see 
Mr. Araiza's identification. (Tr., p.10, L.24 - p.1 I ,  L.2.) Mr. Araiza informed Officer 
Clark that he "never had a driver's license, but he had once been issued a state 
identification card." (Tr., p.1 I, Ls.2-4.) Mr. Araiza then "verbally identified himself' by 
giving Officer Clark his social security number, name and date of birth. (Tr., p.11, Ls.2- 
I Ms. Mosqueda testified that although her son, Mr. Araiza, lived at the residence, he did not have a key. 
(Tr.. 0.53. Ls.2-12. 0.55. Ls.23-25.) , , , .  . ' lnterest/ngly, Officer James ~ake r ,  Officer Clark's commanding officer, who was also on the scene and 
ultimately made the decision to make a forcible entry, testified that Officer Clark "never even told me that 
he had talked to the occupant in the house, the person who owned the house." (Tr., p.40, Ls.1-18, p.43, 
L.24 - p.44, L. l ,  p.45, L.25 - p.46, L.4.) In fact, Officer Baker testified that when he arrived on the scene, 
Officer Clark "told me about the gentleman appearing in the window or trying to get into a window and 
that the guy had apparently gone into the residence," but Officer Clark had failed to tell his supervisor that 
he had already talked to the owner of the residence and was informed that everything was okay. (Tr., 
p.45, Ls.16-24.) 
6.) Officer Clark returned to his vehicle and ran the information given to him by 
Mr. Araiza and it came back with "no record found," which does not necessarily mean 
incorrect information was given, but that the individual may not have a record in the 
system. (Tr., p.12, L.l - p.13, L.3, p.31, L.18 - p.33, L.22.) Officer Clark acknowledged 
that he later concluded that Mr. Araiza had given him the correct social security number 
and date of birth. (Tr., p.38, L.23 - p.39, L.4.) 
Officer Clark returned his police cruiser to run Mr. Araiza's identifying information 
and Mr. Araiza went back into his residence. (Tr., p.12, L.l - p.13, L.19.) Upon 
returning, Officer Clark "knocked on the front door in an attempt to get [Mr. Araiza] to 
come back," then apparently tried to let himself into the residence but the "front door 
was found to be locked." (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 17-25.) Officer Clark, and the other officers now 
present at the residence "continued to knock at the door, and then I even went around 
to different windows of the house and knocked at the windows," for the next several 
minutes. (Tr., p.13, L.25 - p.14, L.7.) Officer Clark testified that "nobody" at the 
residence would answer the door. (Tr., p.14, Ls.3-5.) Officer Baker testified that "We 
could see them through the window and they seem to be ignoring us."3 (Tr., p.42, 
Ls.21-25.) 
"Due to the commotion" made by the officers' continued knocking, a neighbor, 
"later identified as the daughter of' Ms. Mosqueda came over to see what was going 
on. (Tr., p.14, Ls.8-16 (emphasis added).) According to Officer Clark the sister 
allegedly told him that she did not recognize, nor was she familiar with her brother's 
Officer Baker testified that he knew there was an adult female, a male, and children in the house, but 
"couldn't figure out who the adult male was," likely because Officer Clark did not disclose his earlier 
conversation with Ms. Mosqueda, to his colleague. (Tr., p.42, L.20 - p.43, L.2.) 
3 
name? (Tr., p.15, Ls.3-8.) Mr. Clark then "continued to knock on the door" and asked 
the sister to try can call her mother on the cell phone, but did not get an answer. 
(Tr., p.15, Ls.19-23.) Officer Clark then testified that another individual, a young male 
who identified himself as Ms. Mosqueda's grandson, showed up at the residence in his 
vehicle and allegedly indicated that to Officer Clark that he had no idea who the person 
in the residence and that person "should not be inside of his grandmother's house." 
(Tr., p.16, L . l l  - p.17, L.17 - p.9.) Officer Clark never gave a physical description of 
Mr. Araiza to his sister or nephew. (Tr., p.17, Ls.6-10.) Officer Clark testified that they 
continued to "try to gain access to the house" by "knocking at the windows, knocking at 
the doors, [and] yelling inside from the outside," but where unsuccessful. (Tr., p.17, 
Ls. 10-1 7.) 
At that point, Officer Clark testified that the officer's decided to make a "forcible 
entry" into the residence for the safety of the children and elderly female. (Tr., p.17, 
L.21 - p.18, L.3.) The forible entry was made despite information that Ms. Mosqueda 
had told Officer Clark that everything was okay, the officers had not observed anything 
of a violent nature, the officers did not seek any physical contact between the parties in 
the residence, and the officers did not hear any arguing in the house as it was "dead 
silent." (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L . l  (Officer Clark testifying that Ms. Mosqueda said 
everything was okay), p.34, Ls.6-15) (Officer Clark testifying that he heard no unusual 
noises or calls for help coming from the residence), p.45, L.25 - p.46 (Officer Baker 
testifying that he did not know Officer Clark had spoken with the elderly female in the 
house), L.7, p.49, L.22 - p.50, L.50, L.6 (Officer Baker testifying about lack of violence 
4 Officer Clark testified, under oath, that Mr. Araiza's sister told him that "she didn't know anybody" named 
Roy Araiza. (Tr., p.15, Ls.9-12.) 
and noise at the residence).) In fact, both Officer Clark and Officer Baker conceded that 
at the time they made a forcible entry into the residence, they were unaware of any 
crime that had been or was being committed. (Tr., p.34, Ls.16-18 (Officer Clark 
testifying), p.50, Ls.9-12 (Officer Baker testifying).) 
After Ms. Mosqueda's door was "forcibly broken down," Mr. Araiza was 
handcuffed and arrested for resisting and obstructing a police officer. (Tr., p.35, Ls.6- 
11; R., pp.7-8.) Officer Clark then went to an "opposite bedroom" from where Mr. Araiza 
was placed into custody to discover his jacket and a duffel bag allegedly belonging to 
Mr. Araiza. (Tr., p.19, L.21 - p.20, L.4.) Officer Clark stated that "in plain sight" in the 
unzipped duffel back, he observed a "glass pipe with a whitish burnt residue." 
(Tr., p.20, Ls.5-10.) Officer Clark testified, "After seeing the pipe on top or inside the top 
of the bag, I took the bag and removed it out into the kitchen area." (Tr., p.20, Ls.16- 
19.) He continued, "I started to go through the contents briefly of the bag, making sure 
that there wasn't anything that needed to stay in the residence for any purposes, and to 
check for additional paraphernalia and/or controlled  substance^."^ (Tr., p.20, Ls.20-24.) 
Mr. Araiza was charged with felony possession of a controlled substance and 
misdemeanor possession of parapherna~ia.~ (R., pp.16-17.) Mr. Araiza filed a motion to 
suppress the contents discovered in his duffel bag as the warrantless entry into his 
home and subsequent arrest were improper. (Tr., p.68, Ls.2-24; R., pp.21-22.) The 
district court held a hearing on the suppression motion and entered a written 
Memorandum Decision and Order denying Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress. (R., pp.23- 
Unfortunately, the search of Mr. Araiza's duffel baa was not challenged below as an illeaal search of 
property not $thin his "lunge" area incident to arrest- See State v. ~amay, 140 Idaho 834, 103 P.3d 448 
(2004). 
33.) Mr. Araiza then entered a Rule 1 I (a)(2) conditional plea of guilty to possession of 
a controlled substance, preserving his right to appeal the district court's denial of his 
suppression motion, and the State agreed to dismissing the paraphernalia charge. 
(R., pp.39-42, 60.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with 
one year fixed, upon Mr. Araiza's plea of guilty to possession of a controlled substance. 
(R., pp.53-58.) Mr. Araiza filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the district court's 
judgment of conviction. (R., pp.63-64.) 




Did the district court err in denying Mr. Araiza's motion to suppress the warrantless 
entry into his residence and arrest of his person in violation of the Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and Article I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress The Warrantless 
Entw lnto His Residence And Arrest Of His Person In Violation Of The Fourth 
Amendment Of The United States Constitution And Article I, 5 17 Of The ldaho 
Constitution 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Araiza asserts that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures as articulated in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, § 17 of the ldaho Constitution were violated when officers forcibly entered his 
residence without a warrant or exigent circumstances and arrested him for resisting and 
obstructing a police officer without probable cause. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Mr. Araiza contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial 
court's findings of fact which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews 
the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 
ldaho 559, 561,916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred In Denvina Mr. Araiza's Motion To Suppress Where 
There Was Not Exigent Circumstances Justifvina The Officers Warrantless Entry 
lnto His Residence 
Mr. Araiza asserts that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, as well as his rights pursuant to Article I, § 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution were violated when officers of the Jerome County City Police Department 
entered his residence without a warrant and without exigent circumstances and arrested 
him for resisting and obstructing a police investigation without probable cause. The 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 17 of the ldaho 
Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. Warrantless searches are 
presumed to be unreasonable and thus, violations of the Fourth Amendment and 
Article I, § 17. State v. Weaver, 127 ldaho 288, 900 P.2d 196 (1995); State v. Mclntee, 
124 ldaho 803, 864 P.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Wight, 117 ldaho 604, 790 P.2d 
385 (Ct. App. 1990). However, the State may rebut this presumption by establishing 
that a warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement, or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Weaver, 127 
ldaho at 290, 900 P.2d at 198; Mclntee, 124 ldaho at 804, 864 P.2d at 642. If evidence 
is not seized pursuant to a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, the 
evidence discovered as a result of the illegal search must be excluded as the "fruit of 
the poisonous tree." Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); see also 
State v. Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P.788 (1927) (adopting an exclusionary rule under 
the ldaho Constitution). 
The United States Supreme Court has eloquently explained the importance of a 
warrant in searching a person's place of abode: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by 
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the 
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its 
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer 
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.. . . The 
right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is ... a grave concern, not 
only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reasonable 
security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must 
reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by 
a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement 
agent. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948) (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). In fact, "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of 
the Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Courf, 407 
U.S. 297, 313 (1972). Entrance into a residence, without a warrant, is justified only 
when an officer possess probable cause and can demonstrate an urgent need to 
dispose of the traditional warrant requirement. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 
749 (1984). 
The exigent circumstances exception is justified only when the "facts known to 
the police at the time of the entry . . . demonstrate a 'compelling need for official action 
and no time to secure a warrant."' State v. Barrett, 138 ldaho 290, 293, 62 P.3d 214, 
217 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting State v. Pearson-Anderson, 136 ldaho 847, 849, 41 P.3d 
275, 279 (Ct. App. 2001)). Under this analysis, there must be "probable cause to 
believe that an intruder exists and it reasonably appears that persons and property are 
in immediate danger." State v. Rusho, 110 ldaho 556, 560, 716 P.2d 1328, 1332 
(Ct. App. 1986). Using an objective standard, the appellate court determines "whether 
those facts and inferences would 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that 
the action taken was appropriate."' Id (quoting Pearson-Anderson, 136 ldaho at 850, 41 
P.3d at 278). 
Here, the district 'court determined, based on testimony from the officers that they 
were concerned for the welfare of Ms. Mosqueda and the children in the residence, and 
the testimony from Officer Clark that two relatives allegedly could not identify 
Mr. Araiza's name, the officers' actions were appropriate and an exigent circumstance 
existed. (R., pp.27-31.) The district court erred in its determination. The district court 
relied on State v. Wiedenheft, 136 ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001) in denying 
Mr. Araiza's motion to s~ppress.~ Wiedenhelf is illustrative as it demonstrates those 
situations where exigent circumstances might be justified as compared to the instant 
case, where the actions of the officers were absolutely inappropriate and are the 
quintessential acts for which the Fourth Amendment provides protection. In 
Wiedenheft, officers were dispatched to a residence to investigate a 91 1 call reporting a 
possible domestic violence altercation. Id. at 15, 27 P.3d at 874. When Wiedenhelf 
answered the door, she "had a red swollen area in the middle of her forehead and 
appeared to have been recently injured." Id. She "also appeared to be shaking slightly, 
had an unsteady voice, and was visibly upset." Id. An officer asked if there was a 
problem and "Wiedenheft indicated that there was not and refused entry into the home." 
Id. Thinking that there was "something amiss," the officer sought entry into the home to 
determine her safety and of anyone else in the home. Id. Wiedenhelf refused entry 
again and ultimately struck officers at the door, with the door, as she attempted to shut 
it. Id. Wiedenhelf was arrested for resisting and obstructing a police officer. Id. Citing 
to six cases from other jurisdiction where officers went on domestic violence calls and 
observed physical injury, nervousness, or a residence that was in disarray, the Court of 
Appeals determined that given all of the information available to the officers, their 
actions were justified. Id. at 16-17, 47 P.3d at 876-877. 
' The district court relied on Wiedenhelf in analyzing whether there was probable cause for the resisting 
and obstructing arrest. (See R., pp.31-33.) However, as the Wiedenhelf Court made clear in its opinion, 
"the answer to whether the officers were attempting to discharge a duty of their office depends on 
whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that 'exigent circumstances' existed to justify 
the warrantless entry of Wiedenhelfs residence." 136 ldaho at 16, 17 P.3d at 375. 
The facts of the present case are vastly different than those presented in 
Wiedenhelf. In the instant case, after suspecting a burglary after seeing an individual 
standing outside of a window at the Mosqueda residence, Officer Clark proceeded to 
stop his car and knock on the front door after he was unable to locate the unidentified 
man. (Tr., p.6, L.14 - p.7, L.9.) The owner of the residence, Ms. Mosqueda answered 
the door. (Tr., p.7, L.10 - p.8, L.19.) Ms. Mosqueda did not appear to be in any 
physical distress, her clothes were not disheveled, and she did not have apparent 
physical injuries of any kind. T r  p.13, Ls.13-21.) Officer Clark informed 
Ms. Mosqueda that he had seen an individual outside of one of the windows in her 
residence and she informed the officer that it was "my son. He was knocking on the 
window of my other grandson to let him in." (Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.8, p.57, Ls.12-14.) 
Ms. Mosqueda also informed Officer Clark that she was okay. (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, 
L.4.) Thus, at that moment, whatever suspicions Officer Clark's may have had 
dissipated; he had been informed that everything was normal in the Mosqueda 
residence and should have ceased his "investigation" at that point. Moreover, prior to 
breaking down the door at the residence, the officers had the opportunity to observe 
(through windows while snooping around the property) the actions of the parties in the 
residence and had not observed anything of a violent nature, did not see any physical 
contact between the parties in the residence, and the officers did not hear any arguing 
in the house as it was "dead silent." (Tr., p.30, L.22 - p.31, L.l, p.34, Ls.6-15, p.45, 
L.25-p.46, L.7, p.49, L.22 -p.50, L.50, L.6.) 
Thus, there was no evidence, much less probable cause, that would lead officers 
to believe there was even an intruder in the residence, as Ms. Mosqueda told the 
officers that the suspected intruder was her son and she was aware of his presence. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that would lead a reasonable person to believe that 
persons or property were in immediate danger, unlike the information available to the 
officers in Wiedenhelf, supra. Accordingly, the district court erred in finding that there 
were exigent circumstances sufficient to justify the forcible, warrantless entry into 
Mr. Araiza's residence. Thus, the evidence found in this duffel bag, with derived of the 
illegal police conduct should have been suppressed. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963); see also State v. Arregui, 44 ldaho 43, 254 P.788 (1927) (adopting an 
exclusionary rule under the ldaho Constitution). 
D. The District Court Erred In Concludinq That Officer Clark Had Probable Cause 
To Arrest Mr. Araiza For Resistinq And Obstructinq Police Officers 
Mr. Araiza asserts that the district court erred in determining that Officer Clark 
had probable cause to arrest him for resisting and obstructing police officers. In finding 
that Officer Clark possessed probable cause to arrest Mr. Araiza for resisting and 
obstructing a police officer, the district court relied heavily on State v. Wiedenhefi, 136 
ldaho 14, 27 P.3d 873 (Ct. App. 2001). As is discussed in footnote 7, Wiedenhelf 
Court's determination that there was probable cause to arrest Wiedenhelf was premised 
on whether officers were acting under a lawful "duty" under I.C. 3 18-705 such that it 
was necessary for officers to enter her residence to investigate or render aid or 
assistance. Id. at 16, 47 P.3d at 875. The Court was clear to note that "the answer to 
whether the officers were attempting to discharge a duty of their office depends on 
whether there was substantial evidence to support a finding that 'exigent circumstances' 
existed to justify the warrantless entry of Wiedenhelf's residence." Id. Here, as is 
articulated above in section I(C) and incorporated herein by reference, Mr. Araiza 
asserts that officers were without authority to forcibly enter his residence on the night in 
question. Thus, "where an individual refuses to obey an order or obstructs an act of a 
public officer which is contrary to the law, be it statute or constitution, the individual does 
not violate I.C. § 18-705." State v. Wilkerson, 114 ldaho 174, 180, 755 P.2d 471, 477 
(Ct. App. 1998). 
Moreover, unlike the defendant in Wiederhelf, Mr. Araiza did not actively strike 
any of the officers with the door in keeping them out, he just chose to ignore the 
knocking on both windows and doors, snooping around his house, and yelling inside. 
Mr. Araiza had apparently decided to ignore the Jerome police officers, which of course, 
is his right pursuant to the 4'h Amendment. As the ldaho Supreme Court has 
recognized, "Perhaps the most important attribute of our way of life in ldaho is individual 
liberty. A citizen is free to stroll the streets, hike the mountains, and float the rivers of 
this state without interference from the government." State v. Henderson, 114 ldaho 
293, 298, 756 P.2d 1057, 1062 (1988). Accordingly, based on the foregoing argument 
and authority, Mr. Araiza asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress any and all evidence recovered from the search of his duffel bag following his 
unlawful arrest should have been suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Araiza respectfully requests that the district court's order denying his motion 
to suppress be reversed and the evidence resulting from the officer's illegal conduct be 
suppressed. 
DATED this 13" day of February, 2008. 
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